The
Argument from Divine Hiddenness
Why It’s a Knock Down
Argument Against the Existence of a Theistic God
As
the Christian theologian Luigi Giussani so eloquently stated, “A human being
faces reality using reason. Reason is what makes us human. Therefore, we must
have a passion for reasonableness.” (Religious Sense, 1922) I couldn’t have put
it better myself.
One
of the things which theologians as well as nonbelievers agree on is that if God
existed in reality, then it is by our capacity to reason by which we would be
capable of detecting him, or it. Although there have been hundreds of arguments
for the existence of God, some of the most familiar being the ontological
argument, the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, and so on and
so forth, it seems that the atheistic arguments against the existence of God are
rarely ever given a fair shake. This is why I like the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,
or the Argument from Non-Belief as it is also known. It’s a strong argument
against the existence of a theistic God, and one which I think most believers
ought to contend with if they truly want their beliefs to hold any meaning.
Anslem
of Canturbury was one of the first theologians to grapple seriously with the
Problem of Divine Hiddenness (PODH for short). As Anslem observed, we have
never seen the physical presence of God. And if seeing is believing, then wouldn’t be nice if our doubts could be put
to rest if only he made a simple appearance? After all, Jehovah did it for
Moses, why not do it again for us?
In
this essay, I will examine why I believe the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
is a sturdy argument against the commonly held belief in the existence of the Christian
God, why it complicates the general belief in a theistic God, and why it is a
strong argument for atheists since it validates non-belief in most theistic God
concepts.[1]
The Premise of the
Problem from Divine Hiddennness
The
idea behind the argument is this, if God would put our doubts to rest then
there simply would never be any doubting Thomases, nonbelievers, or different
religious faiths. All belief in God, including religious belief, would be
universally the same since they would all be able to (independently) study the
same God instead of different interpretations of various, often times diametrically
opposed, God-concepts.
In
his article on the Problem of Divine Hiddenness, Cristofer
Nobel Urlaub offers the PODH in the form of a syllogism. This is a good way
of framing it, so it’s worth repeating here.
1.
If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
2.
If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3.
Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4.
No perfectly loving God exists (from 2 and 3).
5.
Hence, there is no God (from 1 and 4).
He
goes on to add:
“Not
many theists would argue against the first premise. Many theists describe the
God of the Bible as a personal God of unconditional love. In addition, no
objective person would deny the existence of reasonable non-belief. Theists may
not agree with atheists, but one must admit that some of their arguments are,
at least, well thought out.”
I
have to give Cristofer some much deserved credit, for he isn’t just beating
around the bush, but he’s giving some serious thought to the issue. I hope to
compel him to think perhaps a little more upon the subject before simply coming
to any set conclusion.
The
very existence of non-belief, and I would add contrary beliefs as well, all
contradict the hypothesis that God is all-loving. Why? Because as Cristofer
points out, “a perfectly loving God would want everyone to know he exists, in order
to be saved, and would also have the power to bring about a situation in which
everyone knew he existed.”
The
question which arises is this: if there
is a loving God, then why are there non-believers?
Not
only atheists, mind you, but those who believe in different gods, goddesses,
spirits, and supreme beings, or even new age magic? Why are there polytheists
and pantheists for that matter? Why are their wiccans and Scinetologists? All
forms of divergent-belief, or non-belief, in God signify that God has, in most
cases, not made himself known to the majority of the human race.
It
was Friedrich Nietzsche who once observed that “a god who is all-knowing and
all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his
intentions—could that be a god of goodness?”
Indeed,
this seems to be a direct consequence of PODH. God, if he exists, in all
probability isn’t a loving being. Like Nietzsche pointed out, if God was indeed
all-loving, then he must, by his very nature, be compelled not to sow confusion
and doubt in the minds of others. Was it not St. Paul himself, who in the
presence of the Spirit, proclaimed “God is not the author of confusion” (1
Corinthians 14:33)? Allowing for atheists is one form of confusion.
Allowing
for those who profess belief in a DIFFERENT god is a type of confusion. It’s
not only a confusion, but also it follows that variant belief systems create
doubt as you have to ask which, if any, is the correct belief? Soon you have
believers doubting themselves. Maybe I’m wrong? Maybe that guy over there is
right? Or maybe that guy? Multiply this confusion by the number of different god
beliefs there are, have been, or ever will be along with the number of
non-believers which exist, and this creates one undeniably massive amount of
confusion.
God,
by his loving nature, however, would not want his creatures to be so confused
that they stopped believing and worshipping him. Certainly not the Christian
God, who invented Hell especially for those so confused, which, when you think
about it, denotes an underlying malevolence (but I digress). Through love, God
would be compelled to reveal himself to us in a way which would diminish all
doubt. I am the ONE true God—and I love you—so I shall prove it! Tah-Dah! But,
no. God does not make himself known to us in a way whereby we might share a
universal experience of him. And this is a huge problem for theists.
If
we could all see the elephant in the room there wouldn’t be different forms of
God-belief. All peoples, all religions, would unanimously agree on the same God
as we would have a common denominator of experience to relate back to, and
therefore belief in God would be universal and the same. There wouldn’t be many
variant, dissimilar, or divergent religions, no, there’d be just the one! If
God were real, there’d be the ONE religion based on the ONE true God. Furthermore,
there wouldn’t be non-believers, since, knowing the existence of God would be
like knowing the existence of apples. We’d just accept it as something which
existed beyond a reason of a doubt and move on. But the opposite seems to be
the case. Non-believers exist, variances in God belief are so superfluous as to
be ridiculous, and the only thing which is certain is nobody can be certain
about anything when it comes to the existence of God. There is confusion. And
this denotes a less than loving God or no God at all.
This
is the crux of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness.
Related
Considerations: God’s Properties Obscured
Now
there are several considerations we could assume in light of the above
realization that there does, apparently, seem to be confusion as to the
existence of God and there does seem to be a rather problematic implication
that God may not be all-loving.
These
additional considerations are:
1) Either
God is not all-loving because he authors confusion by not making himself known.
2) Or
God is not all powerful as he continually fails to reveal himself to us.
3) Or
God may be indifferent and indistinguishable from a naturalistic universe with
no God.
4) Or
finally, God is altogether non-existent.
Let
us look at these considerations in more detail, shall we?
1) God is Clearly the
Author of Confusion: Therefore Cannot be All-Loving
So
why do people believe in different Gods? Why not the same God? Well, it seems
it is because they are confused as to the truth of which God is the real God.
Holy Wars have been fought over this. People have died! Would a loving God
allow such atrocities?
If
you believe in an all-loving God, then your answer would have to be: no. So why
has God still not revealed himself in a way which would make himself perfectly
known to all those who are afflicted with confusion and doubt as to his
existence? Wouldn’t this resolve all the conflicts and turmoil generated over
the question of his existence?
As
Cristofer Noble correctly states, “This argument is similar to the problem of
evil because it claims the idea of God is inconsistent with what we observe in
the world. In fact, since ignorance of God would seem to be a natural evil,
many say that the problem of divine hiddenness is an instance of the problem of
evil.”
But
like the Problem of Evil, the consequences are less than desirable for the
theist. God is either malevolent, since he allows
evil, or indifferent, because he
allows evil, or non-existent.
The
Philosopher Stephen Law has posited the Evil God Challenge to believers based
on this precise revelation. He comes at it strictly from the problem of evil
perspective, evil exists, and therefore evil God must be an equally valid
assumption as good exists, therefor loving God. I’ll let you be the judge of
whether his arguments are
convincing.
2) God Continually
Fails to Reveal Himself to Us Therefore Could Not be All-Powerful
Perhaps
God is all-loving, and would like to reveal himself to all, but due to whatever
limitation, simply cannot. Maybe God isn’t all-powerful.
Suddenly
we have to re-evaluate what the theologians have said about the properties
attributed to God. If an all-loving and all-powerful God existed, then the
answer is yes, he would have the power to bring about a situation where
everyone came to know him. It would simply be in his nature to do so, and having
the capacity to do so, he would do so.
Not
having done so, as is our observation, we have to ask which of the properties
might be wrong? We’ve already considered option A, that God might not be all-loving,
so that leaves us with options B and C. B being God might not be all-powerful.
So
although God could very well be all-loving, he simply may not, as Cristofer says, “have the power to bring about a situation
in which everyone knew he existed.”
3) God is Indifferent
and thus Indistinguishable from a Naturalistic Universe
Actually,
I should point out that most naturalistic arguments against the existence of
God can often reduce themselves to the Problem of Evil or, at least, relate
back to it. This is because in a naturalistic universe, the random and arbitrary
amount of suffering looks indistinguishable from a universe governed by a
malevolent and capricious God.
Another
way of stating it would be: A universe created and governed by an evil God
would contain more or less the exact same amount of suffering and evil as we
already see, so whether the universe is created by a God or not, the very
indifference of the universe could reflect the precise indifference of God.
This
would mean that God is super-hidden, because we would have no way of discerning
his acts from the natural world, and if this be the case, theology is a waste
of time as nothing could ever be definitively known about God through his
actions, or rather lack thereof.
4) God is Nonexistent
This
one seems fairly straight forward. If God didn’t exist, we would still have all
the same amount of confusion regarding him, but this confusion would be
predicated on confused terminology, competing God concepts, and the
untrustworthiness of human experience and our habitual capacity to continually
be mistaken in these experiences. Meanwhile, the universe would behave
naturally, and be indifferent in its actions, as it always has.
So
the above four considerations all fall out of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness.
Addressing Some
Counter Objections to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
Some,
like Alvin Plantinga, have postulated that we may simply not know, or
understand, the reason for why God allows confusion, suffering, or evil. In
other words, it may be beyond our comprehension.
This
line or reasoning, however, pushes God dangerously to the edge of no longer
being a Personal being. It is for the theist to tread dangerously close to
deism only to salvage the belief in God because, well, the atheistic argument
was just too good.
I
don’t think I really need to attack such a position, because to me it seems to
be a defensive one that is admitting that God is not exactly like we have
imagined, therefore we throw our hands up in the air and say, oh well, we give
up. We couldn’t possibly understand, so instead of demanding to *see proof of
God, we’ll just accept it on faith that he is beyond our comprehension. But if
so, how could we ever comprehend enough about God to supply a definition? On
faith alone?
I’m
sorry, but I find it a weak and defeatist position. So I don’t necessarily feel
I should devote too much time trying to rebut it.
Another
possibility for why God might stay hidden is that his deliberate attempt to
demonstrate his own existence would impeach everyone’s free will, and if God
has designed us with free will, he cannot contradict his own unimpeachable
laws.
Actually,
I find this rebuttal extremely unsatisfactory. If free will at all existed as theologians describe, then we would
still have the free-choice to deny the existence of God in the face of
overwhelming evidence.
It
would make us willfully ignorant, sure, but this would be the basis of
delusion. Once thing I do not think we can say is that all atheists and
nonbelievers are delusional. After all, are they not the ones who are demanding
to see the evidence? It seems to me, to truly embrace a delusion you would have
to believe in something with unwavering conviction despite evidence to the
contrary. And if this were true, then there wouldn’t be such a thing as a
nonbeliever or atheist. So you see, the mere existence of atheists is a thorn
in the theologian’s back-side!
There
is a strange theological consideration dealing with accountability. Cristofer
explains in detail:
“If
the God of the Bible actually exists, and He made himself absolutely known to
the entire world, then the entire world would then be held accountable for that
knowledge. The idea that we are only accountable for knowledge we possess is
shown in Jesus' saying to the Pharisees, in John 9:41, “... If ye were blind,
ye should have no sin: but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth.”
“If
the Biblical account is true, then the Christian God must be a reality. The infectivity
of a personal appearance is then an indication that some people are prepared to
accept this reality, and some, for whatever reason, are not. Those who are not
able to accept this truth would then be subject to judgments that would not be
just, or which could have been avoided if they had been allowed more time to
prepare.”
Personally,
I only see this as sort of a variant on God is not all-loving consideration,
again. You see, the idea clearly entails that God would have to willfully dole
out unjust deserts (judgments). A loving God could not do this, but a more
sinister sort of God would have no such qualms. So I do not think presuming
accountability is the reason God remains hidden nor is it adequate enough to
resolve the issue, as it can once again point toward a less than loving God,
and then we’d be back to one of the initial consequences of PODH.
So
it seems we always come down to one of two assumptions. God is either not
all-loving, or he doesn’t exist. One of the implications of PODH states that if
God is not all-loving then he cannot be the God of Christianity. And this is
true. But he could be a deistic entity and still exist. All it would mean is
theologians are wrong about the nature of God. But still, the less confuddled
scenario is that God doesn’t exist.
So the
question then becomes, which of the two assumptions makes more sense?
Occam’s
Razor suggests no God at all is the
more probable of the two, and I tend to agree. Loving, or not, God concepts
usually tend to be highly intricate. Ornate in their limitless possibilities,
but very much unnecessary. It’s all fanciful imaginative decorations twinkling
pretty, and although some people are attracted to such elaborate tinsel and trimmings,
I tend to think that the truth, whatever it is, is rather more like the
philosopher Wittgenstein proposed, namely that truth, in all its forms, is
rather mundane. What could be more mundane than the answer simply being: there
is no God?
Some Closing Thoughts
Our
observations, based in the natural world, contradict God as he is claimed to
exist, and that by far is the greatest indicator that we are dealing with a
theoretical concept and not an actual tangible entity. I could be wrong,
however, but as an atheist I am still waiting for something compelling, some
argument or form of evidence, and so far, I haven’t come across anything which
could overcome extremely strong objections to God, like verificationism, justification, empiricism, and the Problem
of Divine Hiddenness.
In
his concluding statement Cristofer’s states:
“So
to those who wonder why a perfectly loving, personal God does not make Himself
known to us, I say that He is, though perhaps not in the way we might expect.”
Having
re-examined the Problem from Divine Hiddeness a bit more thoroughly, I do not
think we can be at all that certain.
It’s not out of the realm of possibility that God is working in mysterious ways
in which his conveyances are subtle, often unnoticed, or not fully understood,
but if so, what, I ask you, sort of God is this?
It’s
certainly not like the God of classic Christian theology. A God which keeps you
guessing till the very end has more in common, dare I say, with Eastern
religions than Western ones. In which case, I would caution, maybe it is high
time theists start looking outside of their local God-concepts, which has for
centuries been trapped in the tight confines of their established theology, and
perhaps start looking for other signs of God.
Once
we have applied reason and scrutiny to other competing God-concepts, let reason
discern which God among a pantheon of gods seems most plausible. I for one, think
you’d be hard pressed to prove any of them.
Ultimately,
if you should, like me, look elsewhere for answers but continue to see the same
problem of divine hiddenness, well, maybe then the idea of a non-existent God
won’t seem so controversial to you. Maybe, just maybe, it will start to make a
lot more sense.
--Tristan
Vick
[1]
I frequently refer to God as a concept. This is because we live in a
naturalistic universe which is governed by physical laws. Consequently, if
there is no direct (tangible) or indirect (causal) evidence which can be
measured and duplicated empirically by an objective third party, allowing God
to be demonstrated as real, then in all likelihood we are dealing with a
theoretical concept. It is alternatively called the God-hypothesis. In
philosophy, anecdotal stories of experience, such as the personal witness of
the Holy Spirit, are meaningless when it comes to proving the veracity of a
belief proposition. Although I do not doubt the sincerity of most believers
that claim they truly believe they have experienced the divine, there is a
difference in the methodology of how one goes about formulating a belief and
how one goes about demonstrating whether or not the basic assumptions of the
belief are true. I am concerned primarily with systems which can demonstrate
their claims, because if they cannot, then they are either merely theoretical
or else false. As the God concept has not yet been fully demonstrated, we must
overcome our religious biases and talk about God as a concept, something
theoretically devised, but which may or may not really exist. To do what theists
do and talk about God as real, without any rigorous demonstration, is to make a
hasty
generalization.